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Private Governance Can Increase
Shipping's Efficiency and Reduce
Its Impacts
ABSTRACT

The shipping industry is a huge component of the world
economy, and although it is often described as an efficient mode
of transport, it still contributes as much carbon dioxide to the
atmosphere as a major industrialized nation. Efficiency
technologies and practices are available that would significantly
lessen shipping's environmental impact, but "amazing
loophole[s]" in international environmental law and a set of
market failures have prevented them from being widely adopted.
These problems have been studied before, but the public
regulatory proposals being discussed run into steep, if not
insurmountable obstacles. This Note argues that shipping
inefficiency can be better addressed through private
environmentalgovernance.By operatingprivately, these forms of
governance bypass the problems that traditional public
regulation faces, allowing higher efficiency standards to be
widely adopted without depending on political will. In so doing,
private governance can better align the incentives of consumers,
firms, and those firms' suppliers.
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I. INTRODUCTION

International shipping is already among the most efficient forms
of transport,1 but its contribution to climate change equals that of a
major national economy. 2 Recent estimates show that in 2012 shipping
accounted for approximately 2.2 percent of global carbon dioxide
emissions. 3 These carbon releases are expected to continue to rise, 4 but
full utilization of existing efficiency technologies and operational
measures could reduce them by 30 percent or more. 5 Numerous
examples of efficient technologies are already available. They range
from concepts as simple as better hull coatings that reduce drag as a
ship moves through the water, to slow-steaming to reduce fuel use, and
even to novel applications of wind technology that supplement a ship's

1.
INT'L CHAMBER OF SHIPPING, SHIPPING, WORLD TRADE AND THE REDUCTION
OF C02 EMISSIONS 1 (2014), http://www.ics-shipping.org/docs/default-source/resources/e
nvironmental-protection/shipping-word-trade-and-the-reductin-f-c2-emissins.pdfs
fvrsn=6 (last visited Sept. 18, 2016) [https://perma.cc/38DC-2UZU] (archived Sept. 18,
2016) [hereinafter ICS].
2.
EUROPEAN COMM'N, TIME FOR INTERNATIONAL ACTION ON C02 EMISSIONS
FROM SHIPPING 1 (2013) ("Emissions from maritime transport ... [are] equivalent to
more than the total annual emissions of Germany ... ").
3.
INT'L MAR. ORG., MARINE ENVTL. PROT. COMM., THIRD IMO GHG STUDY 2014
- EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND FINAL REPORT 1 (2014) [hereinafter THIRD GHG STUDY].
4.
See EUROPEAN COMM'N, supra note 2.
5.
Id. (citing ERIC HEISMAN & CLAIRE DANIELLE TOMKINS, CARBON WAR ROoM,
SHIPPING 3-4 (2011), https://carbonwarroom.com/sites/default/files/reports/Carbon /20
War%20Room-%20Shipping%20Report_1_O.pdf
(last visited
Sept.
18,
2016)
[https://perma.cc/F8E5-URQT] (archived Sept. 18, 2016)).

20161

PRIVATE ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE

propulsion. 6 Efficiency-oriented tools allow shippers to reduce the
carbon intensity of transport per unit moved, 7 and can be used to align
the motives of those paying for transport with groups that seek
8
emissions reductions by lowering fuel costs.
9
These technologies are effective, but several barriers prevent
their widespread adoption. Inefficiency in shipping is a collective action
problem with a global scope. Without a global scheme to price climate
impacts, ship owners externalize the cost of their emissions. An
individual ship owner who internalizes those costs by operating in an
efficient way at the expense of speed-of-service places him or herself at
a disadvantage relative to his or her competitors. Regulatory solutions
are appropriate for collective action problems in some contexts, but are
poorly suited for addressing inefficiency in shipping because shipping
is international and strong participant biases resist adopting efficiency
improvements.
Although public governance structures face steep challenges,
several are either already in place or have been proposed in order to
address shipping emissions. In 2013, the International Maritime
Organization (IMO)-the United Nations (UN) agency tasked with
regulating shipping-adopted fuel-efficiency standards which bind
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(MARPOL) Annex VI parties. 10 In the same year, the European
Commission published a strategy for incorporating maritime shipping
emissions into the European Union's (EU) greenhouse gas reductions

6.

CRAIG EASON, LLOYD'S LIST, MAXIMISING SHIP EFFICIENCY: ENDING THE

DEBATE 15-22 (2015) (describing options that an efficiency-conscious ship owner could
employ, noting that "[t]he environmental argument has been driving shipping to become
more fuel conscious, but so have fuel prices.").
7.
T.W.P. SMITH ET AL., CO 2 TARGETS, TRAJECTORIES, AND TRENDS FOR
INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING §1.3 (2015), http://www.tyndall.ac.uk/sites/default/files/co2_t
argets-trajectories and trends for international shipping.pdf [https://perma.cc/MM7X
-NKRN] (archived Sept. 18, 2016) ("In order for shipping emissions to remain within a
given C02 budget under scenarios of increasing transport demand, the C02 intensity
per unit of transport work will need to reduce.").
8.
EASON, supra note 6, at 2.("The environmental argument has been driving
shipping to become more fuel conscious, but so have fuel prices.").
9.
See infra Section II.B (describing the technical feasibility of technical and
operational measures designed to increase a ship's efficiency).
10. See Press Briefing, Marine Env't Prot. Comm., Mandatory Energy Efficiency
Measures for International Shipping Adopted at IMO Environment Meeting (July 15,
2011) (http://www.imo.org/enlMediaCentre/PressBriefings/Pages/42-mepc-ghg.aspx#.Vg
3Ek 1Vikp [https://perma.cc/JTX6-UPGS] (archived Sept. 18, 2016)) ("Mandatory
measures to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) from international shipping
were adopted by Parties to MARPOL Annex VI... when it met for its 62nd session from
11 to 15 July 2011 [regulations adopted in 2011 would apply January 1, 2013] at IMO
Headquarters in London, representing the first ever mandatory global greenhouse gas
reduction regime for an international industry sector.").
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efforts. 11 That strategy was codified as a regulation, integrating
reductions of carbon emissions from maritime shipping into the larger
12
picture of EU climate policy.
But the disagreements about whether and how the Paris
Agreement would address shipping's emissions exemplify why novel
international agreements in this area are not likely to materialize.
Prior to the 2015 UN climate summit in Paris, commenters suggested
that emissions reductions from maritime transportation should be
considered. 13 The Secretary-General of the IMO, on the other hand,
forcefully argued that it should be the IMO that conducts any
discussion of shipping's role in combating climate change, rather than
the UN summit. 14 Environmental NGOs responded in kind, arguing
that "[t] he IMO is misrepresenting the scope of shipping emissions, and
...[that] it is too easily influenced by the shipping industry." 15 This
dispute came at the tail end of years of discussion about how the EU
should address climate impacts of shipping. 16 The summit's final
product-the Paris Agreement-makes clear that those arguing for
exclusion have succeeded in keeping shipping out of the agreement
17
entirely.
Diligent compliance with existing international instruments
designed to address climate change could begin to address shipping's
emissions, but is insufficient. Even the most recent of these

11.
Communicationfrom the Commission to the EuropeanParliament,the Council,
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions:
Integrating Maritime Transport Emissions in the EU's Greenhouse Has Reduction
PoliciesCOM (2013) 479 final (June 28, 2013).
12. See Regulation (EU) 2015/757 of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 29 April 2015 on the Monitoring, Reporting and Verification of Carbon Dioxide
Emissions from Maritime Transport, and Amending Directive 2009/16/EC, 2015 O.J. (L
123) art. 4.
13. Stephen Gardner, UN Climate Chief Outlines Draft Text for ParisSummit, 38
Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 1211 (Sept. 15, 2015).
14. See Koji Sekimizu, Shipping and Climate Change: A Statement From IMO
Secretary-GeneralKoji Sekimizu, INT'L MARITIME ORG., http://www.imo.org/enIMediaC
entre/HotTopics/GHG/Documents/Shippingo20ando20climateo20change.pdf (last visi
ted Sept. 18, 2016) [https://perma.cc/AB64-E4VU] (archived Sept. 18, 2016) ("IMO has
served global society well. As its record to date so clearly demonstrates, it should be
entrusted to continue that work when it comes to addressing greenhouse gas emissions
from shipping."); see also IMO Only Place for Global Debate on Shipping and Climate
Change, Says IMO Secretary General,HELLENIC SHIPPING NEWS WORLDWIDE (Sept. 29,
2015), http://www.hellenicshippingnews.com/imo-only-place-for-global-debate-onshipping-and-climate-change-says-imo-secretary-general/ [https://perma.ccM894S7NW] (archived Sept. 18, 2016).
15. Ali Qassim, Environmental Groups: Include Shipping in ParisClimate Talks,
38 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 1343 (Oct. 7, 2015).
16.
Stephen Gardner, EU ConsultationMarks Start of Process To Regulate Carbon
Emissions From Shipping, 35 Int'l Env't Rep. 95 (BNA) (Feb. 1, 2012).
17. MICHAEL P. VANDENBERGH & JONATHAN M. GILLIGAN, BEYOND GRIDLOCK:
CLOSING THE PARIS GAP (forthcoming 2016) [hereinafter CLOSING THE PARIS GAP].
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instruments, the Paris Agreement, does not do enough.1 8 Several of the
binding instruments in international law that address this issue have
a global scope: MARPOL, the London Convention, the Convention on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and the Kyoto Protocol, among others.
In addition to these large-scale environmental treaties, regional
agreements also play a role in shipping's governance. 19 Factors outside
the arena of hard law have a significant impact on carbon emissions in
the shipping sector as well. For example, rate structures can play a role
in setting incentives in a way that helps or hinders efforts to promote
20
efficiency.
The existing scholarship on improving efficiency in shipping has
21
demonstrated the technical viability of these efficiency measures.
Literature on shipping has described the most important barriers
preventing more widespread adoption of these measures, 22 but
solutions to these problems have not been forthcoming. 23 Previous
literature on private environmental governance has highlighted the
role that it can play in complementing regimes of traditional
regulation. 24 Private governance instruments have been applied to
concrete environmental goals, both explicitly referencing the existing

18. Id.
19. See generally Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger, Sustainable Development in the
Negotiation of the FTAA, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1118, 1147 (2003) ("The establishment
of the Central American Integration System (Tegucigalpa Protocol) in 1991 has led to
the relatively rapid negotiation and adoption of multiple regional environmental
agreements, covering, among other areas, biodiversity and protected areas, hazardouswaste movement, forest conservation, and climate change.").
20.
See Michael P. Vandenbergh & Jonathan A. Gilligan, Beyond Gridlock, 40
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 217, 223 (2015) [hereinafter Beyond Gridlock] ("The standard
practice is to allocate most shipping fuel costs to the customer, not the shipping company,
leaving the party that has the most control over fuel use with limited incentives to invest
in efficiency.").
21.
See infra Section II.B.
22.
See infra Section III.A.
23.
See, e.g., HEISMAN & TOMKINS, supra note 5, at 21 (discussing reasons why
shipping efficiency measures have not been adopted to the fullest possible extent); Eva
Lema & Dimitris Papaioanou, Policy Instruments and Recent Advances of the Greenhouse
Gas Regulating Framework in Shipping, 14 INTERDISC. ENVTL. REV. 238, 250 (2013)

("[C]ost effective operational and technical emission reduction measures are available to
the shipping sector, although there might be some barriers in the uptake of many of
these measures.").
24. See Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, 99 CORNELL
L. REV. 129, 133 (2013) [hereinafter Vandenbergh, Private Governance] ("Private -private
interactions now generate many of the environmental requirements that affect corporate
and household behavior .. ");see generally Sarah E. Light & Michael P. Vandenbergh,
Private EnvironmentalGovernance, in DECISION MAKING IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (Lee
Paddock & Robert Glicksman eds., forthcoming 2016) (reviewing the existing legal
scholarship on the role of private environmental governance and its applications to
specific environmental goals).
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body of legal scholarship 25 and acknowledging the need for private
forms of regulation in novel areas. 26 Shipping is an unusually apt
example of an area that is well suited to a private governance solution
because it is difficult for governments to regulate, and ship owners face
strong incentives not to operate in the most efficient way possible. 27 To
date, legal scholarship has not focused explicitly on the relationship
between private environmental governance as a coherent set of
alternative regulatory concepts and the shipping industry, leaving a
28
gap that this Note aims to fill.
This Note argues that private governance instruments can fill the
need of shipping more efficiently, thereby reducing the industry's
emissions of greenhouse gasses. Part II of this Note describes the
background of this issue, first by considering the current carbon
impacts from maritime shipping, and second by characterizing the
impact that these emissions have on climate change. Part II then
discusses the public governance mechanisms currently in place that
aim to regulate shipping's carbon emissions. Part III analyzes the
reasons why increasing shipping efficiency is so difficult by discussing
the governance deficits that have made this area challenging. Finally,
Part IV proposes replacing traditional forms of regulation with private
governance systems, building on two key assumptions: (1) excess
carbon emissions are driven in part by market failures that can be
addressed with incentive-shifting solutions, 29 and (2) it is impertinent
to tether future environmental governance to new binding treaties
both because those agreements are unlikely to occur 30 and because the

25. See Kyle W. Robisch, Getting to the (Non)Point: Private Governance as a
Solution to Nonpoint Source Pollution, 67 VAND. L. REV. 539, 568 (2014) (arguing that
private governance holds "significant promise" for addressing the issue of pollution from
nonpoint sources).
26. See Roy A. Partain, Public and Private Regulations for the Governance of the
Risks of Offshore Methane Hydrates, 17 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 87, 135-36 (2015) (suggesting
that private regulations can both "improve standard setting" and increase the "benefits
of public regulation" in the context of exploitation of methane hydrates).
27. See infra Section III.A.
28. But see Scott, et al., The Promise and Limits of Private Standards to Reduce
Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Shipping,'27 J. ENVTL. L. (forthcoming 2017). Scott et.
al will discuss the same greenhouse gas-reducing standards as this Note, but their
discussion is not tied to the broader context of private environmental governance. In
contrast to Scott et al., who only examine private standards in the context of shipping,
this Note describes private environmental governance as a set of actions that exists
independently of their application to shipping, and argues that those actions and
instruments are particularly well-suited to reducing shipping emissions.
29. See Beyond Gridlock, supra note 20, at 261 ("[E]xisting technologies and
operational measures could cut emissions by up to thirty percent by addressing market
failures such as suboptimal information, split incentives, and lack of capital for
retrofitting.").
30. See Michael B. Gerrard, Trends in the Supply and Demand for Environmental
Lawyers, 25 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 1-2 (2000) (noting that "the field [of environmental
law] has fallen into something of a funk.").
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existing instruments still have more to offer. 31 Ultimately, this Note
argues that the application of well-designed private governance tools
can dramatically reduce the carbon emissions of maritime shippingthereby displacing or at least complementing national or international
legislative activity.

II. BACKGROUND
A. Shipping's Contribution to Greenhouse Gas Emissions
International shipping is fundamental to the global economy: 8090 percent of all internationally traded goods are shipped from one
place to another. 32 As discussed here, international shipping only
refers to shipping between ports of different nations. Many of the same
vessels engage in domestic and international shipping, but because the
factors contributing to the difficulty in reducing their emissions arise
from their international activity; domestic shipping is not an explicit
focus of this Note. Nevertheless, because many of the same ships are
engaged in both domestic and international shipping, carbon reducing
strategies that rely on changes in ship technology would cause
reductions in domestic shipping emissions as well. Because they
present a distinct set of issues, military and fishing vessels are not
33
included in this discussion, consistent with the IMO's practice.
The impact of international shipping on the environment and
human health is significant. In its third report on the greenhouse gas
emissions from ships, the IMO found that carbon dioxide emissions
from shipping averaged 1,015 million tons. 34 Although this figure is
large, industry publications cite it as a low figure because it represents
only 2.2 percent of global carbon dioxide emissions. 35 The extent to
which shipping is already an efficient industry complicates attempts to
reduce its emissions. Total emissions from the shipping industry are a
small part of all greenhouse gasses being emitted from human-made
sources. 36 But the global scale of the climate can make any individual

31. See, e.g., Michel A. Becker, Russia and the Artic: Opportunitiesfor Engagement
Within the Existing Legal Framework 25 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 225, 227 (2010) ("[Tlhe
Arctic poses many challenges, but it is not a twenty-first century incarnation of the Wild
West. There are institutions and legal frameworks in place through which the challenges
of Arctic governance and management can and should be addressed.").
32. HEISMAN & TOMKINS, supra note 5, at 3.
33. See THIRD GHG STUDY, supra note 3, at xv (defining 'International Shipping'
as "shipping between ports of different countries, as opposed to domestic shipping.
International shipping [in the IMO's GHG reduction study] excludes military and fishing
vessels.").
34.

See id. at 1.

35. ICS, supra note 1.
36. See Kevin M. Stack & Michael P. Vandenbergh, The One Percent Problem, 111
COLUM, L. REV. 1385, 1388 (2011) (calling problems of this kind "one percent problems,"
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industry or nation look like a small contributor. 37 Climate change is a
problem on an immense scale, but it exists as a result of the
aggregation of numerous individually-small sources of emissions.
Ignoring small contributors would preclude almost any effective
3s
solution.
Further, carbon dioxide is only one part of shipping's
environmental impact. The industry's emissions
constitute
approximately 15 percent of global nitrous oxides, and approximately
13 percent of sulfur oxides. 39 Although some of the shipping that the
IMO studied is domestic, the majority of the emissions are the product
of international shipping. 40 With atmospheric carbon dioxide crossing
the 400ppm threshold in 2016, any opportunity for reduction is
41
significant.
B. Technical Capacity to Reduce Emissions
Because shipping's impact has been well-quantified, efficiency
measures have been tested and shown to be effective. 42 The IMO's most
recent greenhouse gas study forecasts that under business-as-usual
conditions, maritime carbon dioxide emissions will increase by 50 to
250 percent in the period leading up to 2050. 43 Outside of the businessas-usual scenario, using these new technologies and practices could
significantly mitigate the impact of shipping. Even though shipping is

where a small contributor to a problem appears insignificant relative to the whole, but
small contributors are so much of the problem that there can be no solution without
them).
37. Id. ("[Tihe size of the denominator-all activities that produce greenhouse
gases (GHGs), viewed globally-is staggering, and this framing makes almost any source
of emissions... [a] candidate[] for one percent arguments.").
38. Id. ("When all or many of the contributors are relatively small ones, however,
the aggregation of one percent arguments leaves the problem without a solution.").
39. THIRD GHG STUDY, supra note 3, at 2.
40. See id. at 1 (tabulating data on total shipping and international shipping
separately, where the differences are measurable but not substantial-as an example,
total shipping C02 equivalents emissions averaged 2.8 percent of world totals 2007-12,
the international portion of that figure made up 2.4 percent).
41.
See Brian Kahn, The world passes 400ppm carbon dioxide threshold.
Permanently,GUARDIAN (Sept. 28, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2
016/sep/28/the-world-passes-400ppm-carbon-dioxide-threshold-permanently
[https://perma.ccWV6Y-3P75] (archived Oct. 23, 2016) ("[W]e're living in a 400 ppm
world. Even if the world stopped emitting carbon dioxide tomorrow, what has already
put in the atmosphere will linger for many decades to come.").
42.
See Timothy J. Nast, The Response of the InternationalShipping Industry to
Global Climate Change, 44 J. MAR. L. & COM. 29, 31 (2013) ("Industry insiders have
identified significant potential for reducing GHG emissions through technical and
operational measures.").
43.
THIRD GHG STUDY, supra note 3, at 4.
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already recognized as being a highly efficient mode of transport, 44 the
Carbon War Room 45 estimates that "[t]hrough efficiency measures...
shipping can reduce fuel consumption by between 30 and 60 percent,
with the large variance due to differences in models, ages of ships and
technological uncertainty." 46 In light of the huge scale of global
shipping, this reduction would prevent the emission of approximately
47
one billion tons of carbon dioxide.
A recent International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)
report noted that "industry-leading ships are about twice as efficient
as industry laggards across major ship types, due to new ships'
technical efficiency improvements, operational speed practices, and
ship size differences." 48 Both designed efficiency in new ships and
operational measures can have significant impacts on the total
greenhouse gas emissions, and both could form parts of an overall fleet
49
efficiency scheme.
Designed efficiency in new ships is already having a significant
impact on reducing emissions: MAiRPOL's mandated EEDI for new
ships ensures that all newly built ships perform better than older
ones. 50 As a result of these improvements, newer ships have
consistently lower carbon intensity than older ships. 51 The ICCT
demonstrated that ships fifteen years old or older have a carbon dioxide
intensity 23 percent greaterthan industry average, whereas 2011 ships
had a 28 percent lower carbon intensity. 52 The largest efficiency

44. See Nast, supra note 42, at 30 ("[S]hipping is already by far the most carbon
efficient mode of commercial transportation.").
45. See Mission & Vision, CARBON WAR ROOM http://carbonwarroom.com/what-wedo/mission-and-vision (last visited Sept. 16, 2016) [https://perma.cc/5E7B-FR5F]
(archived Sept. 7, 2016) (describing the Carbon War Room as a non-profit, founded with
support from Virgin Galactic's founder Richard Branson, whose mission is to
"accelearate Hthe adoption of business solutions that reduce carbon emissions at gigaton
scale and advance the low-carbon economy.").
46.

HEISMAN & TOMKINS, supra note 5, at 3-4.

47. See id. at 4 (projecting one billion tons of C02 savings under a 60 percent
efficiency scenario).
48.
HAIFENG WANG & NIc LUTSEY, INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON CLEAN
TRANSPORTATION, LONG-TERM POTENTIAL FOR INCREASED SHIPPING EFFICIENCY
THROUGH
THE
ADOPTION
OF
INDUSTRY-LEADING
PRACTICES
1
(2013),

http://www.theicct.org/sites/default/files/publications/ICCT-ShipEfficiency-20130723.p
df (last visited Sept. 8, 2016) [https://perma.cc/MJ8R-87L3] (archived Sept. 8, 2016).
49.
See id. at 9 (displaying a chart which lists operational efficiency measures as
an important method of reducing fuel consumption).
50.
EASON, supra note 6, at 26 ("[T]he fact is that all newbuildings are eco-ships.
They all have increased performance, and it appears that they can easily meet
mandatory performance design requirements."); see also infra Subsection II.C.3
(analyzing the efficiency requirements imposed on new ships under MVARPOL
regulations).
51.
See WANG & LUTSEY, supra note 48, at 16 (stating that 2011 ships, on average,
emit 28 percent less carbon dioxide than industry average containerships (7.5 years-old),
and 72 percent less than fifteen year-old ships).
52.

Id.

1152

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 49..1143

improvement is projected to occur as a result of design speed
reduction.5 3 The relationship between ship speed and fuel consumption
is non-linear, so a ship that travels at a lower speed may emit much
lower emissions than the same ship travelling faster. 54 This
relationship can produce dramatic efficiency gains: for example, a
recent study suggested that "for a containership a 10% engine load
[still] means sailing at about half of the design speed. ' 55 Numerous
other measures can be implemented in new ship construction that offer
emissions reductions which, although small individually, amount to
significant improvements in the aggregate. 56 Examples of other
efficiency measures include propeller polishing, hull cleaning, waste
57
heat recovery, and autopilot upgrades.
In-use efficiencies are even more significant than designed
efficiencies. 58 Because much of the existing fleet is older and not being
replaced as rapidly as in-use efficiencies could be adopted, and because
operational efficiency decreases emissions significantly more than
design efficiency. 59 ICCT analyzed how design efficiency differs from
operational efficiency and found that "operational in-use CO 2
60
emissions far exceed the design C02 emissions rates in each case.
Across ship types, operating at the maximum efficiency that the design
allows would produce an average of 38 percent lower carbon dioxide
61

emissions.
A wide range of efficiency measures may be appropriate for
existing vessels. These range from costly retrofits to simpler
alterations in voyage planning that do not require any technical

53. See id. at 9 (projecting a 10-30 percent potential C02 and fuel use reduction
through the use of design speed reduction technology).
54. See Harilaos N. Psaraftis & Christos A. Kontovas, Ship Speed Optimization:
Concepts, Models and Combined Speed-Routing Scenarios, 44 TRANSP. RES. PART C 52,
(2014), http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0968090X14000667 (last
visited Sept. 8, 2016) [http://perma.cc/XVF4-YFAE] (archived Sept. 8, 2016) [hereinafter
Optimization] (describing the trade-offs associated with a charterer's speed decision).
55. Id. at 53.
56.
See WANG & LUTSEY, supra note 48, at 9 (tabulating the improvements that
can be made, both in new design and in in-use efficiencies).
57. See id. (listing the efficiencies described in the text, among a list of others that
totals twenty measures).
58.
See Harilaos N. Psaraftis & Christos A. Kontovas, Speed Models for EnergyEfficient Maritime Transportation:A Taxonomy and Survey, 26 TRANSP. RES. PART C
331, 331-32 (2012), http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pi/S0968090X1200124
6 [https://perma.cc/53EF-J7N7] (archived Sept. 8, 2016) [hereinafter Models] ("Simply
stated, for a variety of reasons, economic and environmental, sailing fast may not
necessarily be the best choice, and optimizing ship speed is receiving increased emphasis
these days and is likely to do so in the years ahead.").
59. See WANG & LUTSEY, supra note 48, at 11 (pointing out that average
operational efficiency currently falls short of design efficiency, indicating that there is
room to improve efficiency through other measures).
60. Id.
61.
Id. at 12.
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changes to a vessel. 62 Some illustrative options at the high-cost end of
the range include installation of wake-accelerating modifications that
increase efficiency 63 and advanced hull coatings, 64 which show
promise for vessels with a long operational life. Monitoring software,
which is available from multiple sources, allows for accurate
measurement and fine adjustments in efficiency and vessel
operation. 65 Finally, wind technology can be adapted to modern needs
and may be a viable option for decreasing a vessel's dependence on
fossil fuels. 66 Although wind power may seem like an anachronistic
suggestion, there are currently companies around the world developing
67
new commercial applications of wind propulsion.

62. See Qiang Meng, et al., Containership Routing and Scheduling in Liner
Shipping: Overview and Future Research Directions,48 TRANSP. SCI. 265, 265-80 (2014)
(reviewing and summarizing past studies on containership routing to explain a gap
between academic work and industry practice); Shuaian Wang, et al., Bunker
Consumption Optimization Methods in Shipping: A CriticalReview and Extensions, 53
TRANSP. RES. PART E 49, 49-62 (2013) (generating "methods [that] could be used to
optimize the sailing speed of ships, minimize emissions, and plan jointly for port
operations and shipping operations.").
63. See, e.g., Becker Mewis Duct, BECKER MARINE SYSTEMS, http://www.beckermarine-systems.com03 products/products mewis.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2016)
[https://perma.cc/SFL2-2DRK] (archived Sept. 8, 2016) ("The average of fuel saved [by
using this technology] is at 6%. This also means 6% less emissions of greenhouse gases.").
64. See, e.g., MSC Reaps Fuel Efficiency Gains with Jotun's Hull Performance
Solutions, JOTUN MARINE COATINGS (Feb. 19, 2015), http://www.jotun.com/de/en/b2b/n
ews/MSC-vessels-with-Jotun-Hull-Performance-Solutions. aspx [https://perma.cc/QW5Z9L9L] (archived Sept. 8, 2016) (quoting a customers' statement that Jotun's state.of-theart hull coating SeaQuantum X200 "has shown to be an effective antifouling technology
to lower fuel costs and associated carbon emissions...").
65.
See, e.g., EASON, supra note 6, at 19 ("[C]ompanies such as BMT Smart,
Marorka, Eniram and Greensteam... all have software tools that can be used to monitor
energy use, and thus fuel consumption, by using data from an array of sensors.").
66. See Marine Environment Protection Commission Resolution 213(63), MEPC
63/23, at 11 (Mar. 2, 2012) [hereinafter SEEMP Resolution] ("Even wind assisted
propulsion may be worthy of consideration."); EASON, supra note 6, at 19-21 (discussing
companies developing and marketing wind technologies to assist propulsion of
commercial vessels); Nast, supra note 42, at 31 (noting the practical feasibility of
renewable energy in the form of thrust generated by wind and the worthwhile byproducts
of such technology).
67.
See, e.g.,
Suction Wing Propeller, CENTRE DE RECHERCHE POUR
L'ARCHITECTURE ET L'INDUSTRIE NAUTIQUES, http://site.craintechnologies.com/index.ph

p/en/wind-propulsion-en/suction-wing-en (last visited Mar. 3, 2016) [https://perma.cc/K
F5T-KCY6] (archived Sept. 8, 2016) (suction wing technology); NORSEPOWER,
http://www.norsepower.com/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2016) [https://perma.cc/2Q6J-4ZGK]
(archived Sept. 8, 2016) (modernized Flettner rotors); Skysails - die ndchste Generation
der Windkraft!, SKYSAILS GMBH, http://www.skysails.info/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2016)
[https://perma.cc/U7J4-2JPA] (archived Sept. 8, 2016) (sky sails); see also SILVERSTREAM
TECHNOLOGIES, http://www.silverstream-tech.com/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2016)
[https://perma.cc/T96T-VJXU] (archived Sept. 8, 2016) (air lubrication).
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All of these technologies lessen a ship's greenhouse gas emissions
by reducing fuel consumption, and in so doing also lower costs.68 But
the barriers that block their full adoption are significant:
It is widely accepted that, the maritime sector should contribute to the
global effort of mitigating GHG emissions. However, most parties in the
IMO believe that the maritime transportation should not be treated like
other industries under the Kyoto Protocol due to the complexity of this
industry and its special role in world trade.69

This Note argues that overcoming these barriers is possible and
that doing so will involve using these technologies' full potential
without depending on formal legal intervention.
C. Existing Public Governance Structures
Inter-governmental bodies at the international level have
attempted to address shipping's greenhouse gas emissions. This Part
explores these traditional governmental responses, identifying
UNCLOS, UNFCCC, MARPOL, and several principles of customary
international law. Each of these UN organizations are forms of public
governance, and each is limited in its capacity to fully address shipping
emissions.
1. UNCLOS
UNCLOS is the primary UN instrument governing the sea
generally. 70 Although the treaty is comprehensive and widely
accepted, its tools for addressing climate change are weak. 71 Part
twelve of UNCLOS prioritized the protection and preservation of
oceans. 72 States are encouraged to cooperate in establishing rules and
standards designed "to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the
marine environment from any source, using for this purpose the best

68. See Optimization, supra note 54, at 53 ("In addition to being important from
an economics perspective, speed reduction can also have important environmental
benefits, as emissions from ships are directly proportional to fuel burned. In that sense,
speed reduction is one of the important operational or logistics-based measures to reduce
emissions from ships.").
69. Lema & Papaioanou, supra note 23, at 243.
70. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S.
397 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
71. See Marcus A. Orellana, Climate Change and the InternationalLaw of the Sea:
Mapping the Legal Issues, in CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS ON OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW
262 (Randall S. Abate ed., 2015) ("[T]he application of general obligations to the climate
change mitigation context must overcome formidable obstacles ... evincing the
weaknesses of the legal tools available in UNCLOS to address climate change.").
72. See UNCLOS, supra note 70, arts. 192-237 (providing-in Art. 192-the thennovel concept that "[s]tates have the obligation to protect and preserve the marine
environment.").
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practicable means at their disposal and in accordance with their
capabilities." 73 UNCLOS' broad definition of pollution in the marine
environment encompasses hazards to human health and impairment
of the quality of sea water. This definition has left an open question
concerning whether it may be possible to construe "pollution" to include
greenhouse gas emissions.7 4 Regardless of how this open question 75 is
ultimately resolved, a claim under this general obligation would have
to overcome substantial obstacles relating to proof of causation, the
extent to which common but differentiated responsibilities provide a
76
safe harbor, and more.
UNCLOS' provisions for the passage of foreign ships through
territorial seas similarly provide only a limited framework for
addressing environmental goals. The Convention generally allows all
ships a right of innocent passage through other states' territorial seas,
but it qualifies that right with a requirement that those vessels'
passage "is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the
coastal State. ' 77 Prejudicial is further qualified so that the right of
innocent passage allows neither "any act of wilful [sic] and serious
pollution contrary to this Convention,"78 nor any passage "in violation
of the principles of international law."' 79 Coastal states are empowered
to place limitations on innocent passage through their territorial seas
that pertain to the preservation of that state's environment, but no
state can unilaterally create restrictions on "design, construction,
manning or equipment of foreign ships."80

73. Id. at art. 194.
74. Id. at art. 1(4). Cf. Orellana, supra note 71, at 259 (pointing out that despite
the broad language of the pollution definition, situating climate change emissions within
its scope raises difficult issues).
75. See Orellana, supranote 71, at 259 ("Whether this general obligation is capable
of effectively addressing climate change emissions remains an open question, however.");
see also PalauSeeks UN World Court Opinion on Damage Caused by GreenhouseGases,
UN NEWS CENTRE (Sept. 22, 2011), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=3

9710#.VkkkTPmrTV [https://perma.cc/4YF5-KXCP] (archived Sept. 8, 2016)
(announcing Palau's request that the ICJ issue an advisory opinion on whether countries
have a responsibility to ensure that greenhouse gas emissions in their territory do not
harm others).
76. See Orellana, supra note 71, at 259-62 (picking apart the challenges that
would attach to proving a claim under this general obligation, if it is an obligation at all).
77. UNCLOS, supra note 70, at arts. 17, 19 (establishing right of innocent passage
and clarifying that innocent passage is one that is not prejudicial, respectively).
78. Id. at art. 19(2)(h).
79. Id. at art. 19(2)(a).
80. See id. at arts. 21(1)(f), 21(2) (preventing unilateral action by one state by
stipulating that no state can take measures restricting foreign vessels "unless they are
[simply] giving effect to generally accepted international rules or standards").
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2. UNFCCC
Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC) are already signatories to that convention's
ambitious goal of stabilizing emissions within a time frame that will
"allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that
food production is not threatened and to enable economic development
81
to proceed in a sustainable manner.
In 1997, the Kyoto Protocol to the convention directed states to
''pursue limitation or reduction of emissions of greenhouse gases not
controlled by the Montreal Protocol from aviation and marine bunker
fuels, working through the International Civil Aviation Organization
and the International Maritime Organization." 82 Passing this
responsibility to the IMO was motivated in part by the difficulties of
applying emissions standards to so many different party nations,8 3 but
also acknowledged the older, more technically-expert IMO mission "[t]o
provide machinery for co-operation among Governments in the field of
governmental regulation and practices relating to technical matters of
all kinds affecting shipping engaged in international trade .... ,,84
Even with significant regulatory authority delegated to the IMO,
the UNFCCC could have an impact on shipping emissions by setting
goals, or designing and integrating clear targets into the complete
picture of a global emissions reduction plan. Shipping was not the
target of any new requirements. The Convention's failure to do so has
already been termed a "conspicuous hole" in the Paris Agreement. 85
The Paris Agreement codified nationally -determined emissions
reduction targets determined by the party states. 86 Commenters have
pointed out that there is a gap between what needs to happen for the
Agreement to achieve the goals that it aspires to, and what would

81. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, S.
TREATY DoC. No. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107, art. 2 [hereinafter UNFCCC].
82. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change,
art. 2(2),
Dec.
11,
1997,
2303
U.N.T.S.
148;
U.N.
Doc.
FCCC/CP/1997/L.7/Add. 1[hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].
83. See Nast, supra note 42, at 32 ("The Kyoto Protocol excludes emissions from
shipping (marine bunker fuels), due to the global nature of shipping and the difficulty in
assigning ship sourced emissions to economic activities of specific countries.").
84. Convention of the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization,
art. 1, Mar. 6, 1948, 9 U.S.T. 621, 289 U.N.T.S. 48. The organization's name was later
simplified to the International Maritime Organization as it is now known.
85. Benjamin Hulac, Rules for Ship, Airplane Emissions Left Out of Paris Deal,
CLIMATEWIRE (Dec. 14, 2015), http://www.eenews.net/climatewire/2015/12/14/stories/10
60029447 (subscription required) [https://perma.cc/CK6R-6GZ6] (archived Sept. 8,
2016).
86. Paris
Agreement,
art.
2(1)(a),
Dec.
12,
2015,
U.N.
Doc.
FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev. 1 [hereinafter Paris Agreement].
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result if the only outcome of the agreement is compliance with the
commitments already made:
Although the Agreement takes a significant first step, without additional
steps the world will fall far short of even the more modest goal [of keeping
warming below 2°C]. This is the Paris Gap-the difference between the
goals of the Paris Agreement and what it will actually achieve, even if all
countries fully comply with their commitments.87

In theory, achieving greater reductions in emissions of greenhouse
gases could have come about through intensified national
commitments or reductions from areas not contemplated by the
agreement, like shipping. Because the Paris Agreement did not
address these areas, there is an ongoing need for measures that go
beyond the commitments it contained. Although critics have decried
the Paris Agreement's omission of shipping, 88 opportunities for
reducing shipping emissions exist through other instruments. Given
the relatively poor track record of international legal instruments in
addressing climate change, venues other than treaty-making may be
even more effective than inclusion in the Paris Agreement.
3. MARPOL
The primary international instrument directly regulating
shipping is the International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution from Ships (MARPOL).8 9 The IMO is the UN. agency that
adopted MARPOL; it has "global standard-setting authority for the
safety, security and environmental performance of international
shipping."90 In its original form MARPOL did not address air pollution

87. CLOSING THE PARIS GAP, supra note 17.
88. Hulac, supra note 85, ("The final text from the Paris summit ... following days
of syntactical sanding, buffing, tweaking and negotiating, requires no action from the
shipping and aviation industries ....).
89. International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, Nov. 2
1973, 34 U.S.T. 3407, 1340 U.N.T.S. 184; see also Protocol of 1978 Relating to the
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, Feb. 17 1978, 34
U.S.T. 3407, 1340 U.N.T.S. 61 (amending the original convention-these documents are
collectively referred to as 'MARPOL 73/78' or simply 'MARPOL'). MARPOL restricts
dumping waste at sea, but excludes wastes that are incidental to the normal operation
of vessels. While the protocol thus cannot be used to regulate greenhouse gas emissions
from ships, it tangentially relates by regulating how sub-sea carbon sequestration and
ocean fertilization may be undertaken. See INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION,
CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE LONDON CONVENTION AND PROTOCOL (2011), http://www.i
mo.org/en/OurWork/Environment/LCLP/Emerginglssues/Documents/LCLP%20and%20
climate% 20change.pdf [https://perma.cc/EBA6V49D] (archived Sept. 8, 2016) (explaini
ng that the London Convention and London Protocol apply to a "significant proportion of
global shipping").
90. Introduction to the IMO, INT'L MAR. ORG., http://www.imo.org/
en/About/Pages/Default.aspx (last visited Sept. 8, 2016), [https://perma.cc/QV8X-CV8G]
(archived Sept. 8, 2016).
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from ships, focusing instead on oil, harmful substances carried in bulk,
harmful substances in packaged form, ship-generated sewage, and
garbage. 91 In 1997, the IMO adopted Annex VI, which added air
pollution to the class of pollution that MARPOL covers by setting limits
on the emission of nitrous and sulfur oxides. 92 In that same year, the
IMO produced its first study on greenhouse gas emissions from ships,
concluding that using operational and technical measures reduces
93
shipping's impact.
In 2009, the IMO's Marine Environment Protection Committee
(MEPC) approved a set of voluntary efficiency measures. 94 These
included guidelines for an Energy Efficient Design Index for New Ships
(EEDI), a Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP), and an
Energy Efficiency Operational Indicator (EEOI).9 5 In 2011, the IMO
adopted an amendment to Annex VI that included EEDI and SEEMP
as legally binding regulations addressing designed efficiency and
operational efficiency, respectively, based on the voluntary guidelines
approved in 2009.96
Regulation 21 of MARPOL Annex VI sets out an EEDI formula
that creates different levels of reduction for different categories of ships
and sets progressive steps to create greater reductions over the course
of the regulation's implementation. 97 Rather than prescribing a
specific technology or design requirement, EEDI imposes a minimum
efficiency standard per capacity mile. 98 In theory, this should allow
ship builders to choose the most cost-efficient way to meet the
standard. 99 The EEDI standard is expressed as percentage reduction
from reference emissions values that are established for each of the

91.
Eric. V. Hull, Missing the Boat on Protecting Human Health and the
Environment: A Re-Evaluation of the EPA's Emissions Policy on Large Ocean-Going
Vessels, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 1035, 1051 (2008) ("As originally enacted, MARPOL consisted
of five separate annexes [each] designed to combat a particular class of
pollutants... [oil, harmful substances in bulk and packaged forms, sewage and garbage,
and in] 1997, the IMO adopted Annex VI to deal with air pollution from ships.").
92.
See id.
93.
See MD SAIFUL KARIM, PREVENTION OF POLLUTION OF THE MARINE
ENVIRONMENT FROM VESSELS: THE POTENTIAL AND LIMITS OF THE INTERNATIONAL
MARITIME ORGANISATION 109 (2015) (cataloging the history of the IMO's studies on

greenhouse gas emissions from ships).
94. Id.
95.

Id.

96.
See IMO, Mar. Envtl. Protection Comm. (MEPC), Res. 203(62), U.N. Doc.
MEPC 62/24,/Add. 1 (Jul. 15, 2011) [hereinafter EEDI Resolution] (requiring EEDI in
regulation 21, and SEEMP in regulation 22).
97.
See id. at 11 (presenting formula and step-by-step plans for different types of
ships to achieve these efficiency standards).
98.
See id. at 11-12 (creating efficiency standard while retaining flexibility for
those obliged to meet it); see also KARIM, supra note 93, at 111-13 (providing an
explanatory background on EEDI's technical aspects).
99. KARIM, supra note 93, at 112.
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categories of ships that are covered by the standard. 100 Although the
reference line values are unique to the different categories of ships
described in the regulation, the EEDI reduction standard uniformly
calls for a 30 percent reduction by 2025 and continuing reductions
beyond that date. 101
In general, EEDI applies to new ships or existing ships that have
undergone conversions so extensive that they would be considered new
ships.10 2 However, there are a variety of exclusions from the standard
that limit its scope to some extent. At the beginning of the first and
second implementation phases, the status of technological advances is
to be reviewed, and "if proven necessary, [the Administration may]
amend the time periods, the EEDI reference line parameters for
10 3
relevant ship types and reduction rates set out in this regulation."'
The regulation only applies to ships over 400 gross tonnage, excludes
ships that only navigate within the sovereign waters of their flag state,
and-subject to a few limitations-can be waived for four years after

104
the regulations came into force.

SEEMP was the second mandatory efficiency measure that the
IMO adopted. By making these provisions mandatory, the MEPC
acknowledged that "[i]n global terms it should be recognized that
operational efficiencies delivered by a large number of ship operators
will make an invaluable contribution to reducing global carbon
emissions." 10 5 Yet in contrast with EEDI, SEEMP does not create
obligatory efficiency targets for ships or their operators. 10 6 Instead, its
aim is to create a planning mechanism through which companies and
operators may voluntarily undertake emissions reductions. 107
The MEPC's guidelines direct a company to develop ship-specific
SEEMPs in four steps: (1) planning, (2) implementation, (3)
monitoring, and (4) self-evaluation and improvement. 108 The
guidelines also include a catalogue of efficiency measures that can be
included in the SEEMP, providing measures to be undertaken at
various stages of the journey.10 9 These range from voyage specific
measures like improved voyage planning, speed optimization, and

100. See EEDIResolution, supranote 96, at 11.
101. Id. at 11-12.
102. Id. at 11.
103. Id at 12.
104. Id. at 9-10; KARIM, supra note 93, at 113.
105. SEEMP Resolution, supra note 66, at 3.
106. KARIM, supra note 93, at 111. ("Although SEEMP is mandatory, it does not
impose a specific energy-efficiency target for ships or companies").
107. See id. ("The Convention obligates ship-owners to take into account the
guidelines adopted by the IMO, but does not make it compulsory to follow those
guidelines. This leaves a broad discretion to ship-owners to decide what measures to
adopt for ensuring energy efficiency.").
108. SEEMP Resolution, supra note 66, at 4.
109. Id. at 7.
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weather routing, to company-wide actions like optimum utilization of
fleet capacity and integrating regular in-water hull maintenance
assessments to minimize resistance. 110 Identifying and collecting this
information does not require achieving efficiency gains, but having
data is a crucial building block toward ultimately targeting a
reduction. 1
4. Customary International Environmental Law
Climate change is the quintessential transboundary harm, where
112
the impacts of actors in one state can affect the rest of the world.
Customary international law dictates that despite the strong respect
for national sovereignty, states have a responsibility to prevent
transboundary harms from actions arising within their borders. 113
This principle-termed the prevention of transboundary harms-was
expressed early in the history of international environmental law as
Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration. 114 As adopted there, the
principle indicates that "[s]tates have ... the responsibility to ensure
that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage
to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction." 115 The Trail Smelter case is the classic example
of a transboundary harm, but it highlights the key reason that this
principle insufficiently addresses climate harms. There, the claim was
between two governments willing to take responsibility for concrete,
immediate harms and hoping to "reach a solution just to all parties
concerned." 116 Relative to their sources, the consequences of

110. See id. at 7-11 (detailing efficiency measures that could be undertaken as
examples of what might be included in a SEEMP, with options ranging from the highly
technical to strategic logistical choices about selecting trade and sailing areas for a ship).
111. Nast, supranote 42, at 34 ("A tangible means of gauging vessel efficiency is a
crucial aspect of any successful solution to the climate change problem in the maritime
sector.").
112. See supra Section IJ.A. (describing the impact of shipping's emissions on the
global climate).
113. See Trail Smelter Arb. (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A.1905, 1962-63 (Perm. Ct. Arb.
1938 & 1941) [hereinafter Trail Smelter] (resolving U.S.-Canada damages claim arising
from sulfur dioxide fumes that migrated across the border under the principle that a
state may not allow actions in its borders to harm another state); INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REPORTS: EARLY DECISIONS 476 (Cairo A. R. Robb ed., 1999)
(describing the Swiss Federal Tribunal's Nov. 1900 resolution of a transboundary dispute
concerning a shooting range: "in public international law ... the exercise of one's own
right should not prejudice the right of one's neighbor.").
114. Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment, Jun. 16, 1972, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev. 1.
115. Id.
116. See Trail Smelter, supra note 112, at 1912; cf. Catherine Tinker, Responsibility
for Biological Diversity Conservation Under InternationalLaw, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 777, 806 (1995) (noting that in terms of stare decisis, "the Trail Smelter arbitration
[is] a decision with no precedential value in any judicial forum").
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greenhouse gas emissions are remote in time and space. Even if the
responsibility to prevent transboundary harms might dictate that
certain states should be responsible to specific parties for climate
harms, it would remain unclear what court could adjudicate that claim
117
and even less clear whether a decision would be meaningful.
Since the UNFCCC was negotiated at the 1992 Rio Convention,
the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities has been
prominent in international action on climate change. 118 In general
terms, the principle recognizes that a problem like climate change is a
common concern of all states, but that states' have different levels of
responsibility both in terms of being causes of the problem and in what
action will be taken to address it. The purpose that animates the use
of the principle in this context is more nuanced:
[T]he purposes of differentiation can be summarized as follows: (1) to
assign a greater obligation to those who have contributed more to a
particular environmental problem, e.g., climate change; (2) to assign a
greater obligation to those who have more resources or capacity to deal
with a particular situation, even if they did not cause that problem; (3)
to recognize the special situation of one or more countries-and that does
not necessarily have to be only developing countries, it can be other
countries as well; (4) to recognize that countries may have different
priorities and that a particular environmental issue may not be their top
priority; and (5) to promote broad participation in an agreement. This is
a practical approach. Even though it may be inappropriate or illogical to
make a distinction between parties, it is done because more parties may
then join the agreement and then we all will be better off.119

Despite the intuitive equitable appeal of including this principle
in international climate agreements, it has not been effective. 120
Because national contributions of greenhouse gasses to total
atmospheric stocks are decidedly unequal, 121 the principle of common

117. See generally Jessica Gordon, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
to Hold HearingAfter Rejecting Inuit Climate Change Petition, 7 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L.
& POL'Y 55 (2007) (reporting on the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights'
denial of an Inuit Circumpolar Council petition alleging that the United States' inaction
on greenhouse gas emissions violated their human rights).
118. UNFCCC, supra note 81, at 1 ("Acknowledging that the global nature of
climate change calls for'the widest possible cooperation by all countries and their
participation in an effective and appropriate international response, in accordance with
their common but differentiated responsibilities ....); see also Justin Lee, Rooting the
Concept of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities in Established Principles of
InternationalEnvironmental Law, 17 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 27, 30 (2015) (explaining how
common but differentiated responsibilities have appeared consistently in international
instruments since the 1992 Rio Convention).
119. Susan Biniaz, et al., Common but Differentiated Responsibility, 96 AM. SOC'Y
INT'L L. PROC. 358, 359 (2002).
120. See id.at 361 ("In my view the [common but differentiated responsibilities]
principle is not necessary, and it is not helpful.").
121. KEVIN A. BAUMERT, ET AL., WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE, NAVIGATING THE
NUMBERS: GREENHOUSE GAS DATA AND INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE POLICY 113 (2005)
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but differentiated responsibilities has negatively affected the
development of international responses to climate change. Motivated
in part by this principle, the Kyoto Protocol only imposed binding
commitments on developed countries, leaving out the developing
economies that have since become significant contributors to
greenhouse gas emissions. 122 This separation led the United States to
decline to ratify the protocol, and continued to block implementation of
international instruments on climate regulation. 123 The Paris
Agreement
shifts
the
dialogue
away from
differentiated
responsibilities, but leaves room for the concept to operate by allowing
124
parties to individually determine what their contributions will be.
Drawing on the principle of differentiated responsibilities, parties that
were considered developing at the time of the Kyoto Protocol are still
able to proffer diluted goals relative to other states if they decide that
their responsibilities are not equal to larger contributors.

III. ANALYSIS
A. Reasons for the Problem: Public GovernanceDeficits and
Market Failures
Despite the range of options available to allow shipping to
maintain its place in the world economy while emitting less carbon,
significant barriers stand in the way. At its core, the problem of
inefficiencies in shipping is a collective action problem: the atmosphere
is a common pool into which individual shippers can pollute with
impunity. When this occurs, the value of the whole pool is reduced. In
effect, this imposes a cost on all other participants in this system. If
one participant elects not to contribute to polluting the atmosphere, he

(tabulating total national contributions to atmospheric CO2 stocks during the period
from 1850-2002).
122. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 82, art. 3 ("The Parties included in Annex I [only]
shall.., ensure that their aggregate anthropogenic carbon dioxide equivalent
emissions ... do not exceed their assigned amounts .... ).
123. See S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1998) (enacted) ("[Tihe United States should not
be a signatory to any protocol [which would] mandate new commitments to limit or
reduce greenhouse gas emissions for the Annex I Parties, unless the protocol or other
agreement also mandates new specific scheduled commitments to limit or reduce
greenhouse gas emissions for Developing Country Parties within the same compliance
period."); Lee, supra note 118, at 34 (describing the Congress' decision not to ratify the
Kyoto Protocol and how subsequent UNFCCC actions have beneficially eroded the notion
that developing countries need not act on climate).
124. See Paris Agreement, supra note 86, at 1 ("Acknowledging that climate change
is a common concern of humankind, Parties should, when taking action to address
climate change, respect, promote and consider their respective obligations on human

rights, the right to health, the rights of indigenous peoples, local communities, migrants,
children, persons with disabilities and people in vulnerable situations .... ") (emphasis
added).
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or she bears the full cost of finding a non-emitting way to ship, but her
share of the value of the common pool is still reduced by all other
participants' use. As a result, any individual ship owner has a
disincentive to be the lone efficient operator.
This Part analyzes the shortcomings of public governance that are
significant obstacles to overcoming these problems, and goes on to
describe the market failures that further undermine participants'
motives and ability to change this regime.
1. Flags of Convenience
One of the most important factors making collective action on
shipping's emissions challenging is the widespread use of flags of
convenience. In other words, the owners can choose which nationality
their vessel will bear. "In general terms, it can be said that a vessel
flies a flag of convenience when it has no real economic connection (or
no 'genuine economic link') with the country whose flag it flies."' 125 A
state is said to have an "open registry" when it accepts vessels on its
shipping register with which it has no genuine economic link. 126 While
estimates are imprecise and varied, as much as half of the world's fleet
flies flags of convenience. 127 Registering under a flag of convenience
can benefit ship owners seeking to avoid the cost of regulation: evading
taxes, skirting government regulation, concealing the owner's identity,
and in some cases escaping law enforcement's reach. 128 Despite the
potential for facilitating evasion of regulations, the principle reason
why companies register flags of convenience is to reduce costs. 129
The costs of registering a ship in a nation with robust
requirements is significant. As an example, when the U.S. Government
Accountability Office analyzed the impacts of a rule that would require
U.S. liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports to be made using only U.S.
built and flagged vessels, the costs were found to be significantly
higher than those associated with a foreign flagged fleet. 130 The U.S.

125. Awni Benham, Ending Flag State Control?, in INTERNATIONAL MARINE
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: INSTITUTIONS, IMPLEMENTATIONS AND INNOVATIONS 123, 126

(Andree Kirchner ed., 2003).
126. Id. at 127.
127. Id. at 125; see also U.S. GOVT ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-16-104, MARITIME
TRANSPORTATION: IMPLICATIONS OF USING U.S. LIQUEFIED-NATURAL-GAS CARRIERS FOR

EXPORTS 18 (2015) [hereinafter GAO Report] ("All currently operating LNG carriers are
foreign-flagged.., and, according to mariner unions we spoke with, employ few U.S.
officers and no unlicensed U.S. mariners.").
128. Benham, supranote 125, at 127.
129. See id., at 127 ("The reasons why these [reputable transnational] companies
choose flags of convenience relate principally to crew costs.").
130. GAO Report, supra note 127, at 23 (concluding that the cost impacts of using
U.S. built and flagged vessels for LNG exports would "increase the cost of transporting
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built and flagged requirement could, GAO concluded, "be associated
with about 24 percent higher shipping rates if all of the additional cost
were passed on to the buyer." 131 Scholars concerned with
environmental protection, mariners' safety, and the governance
impacts of flags of convenience have noted the "amazing loophole in
international law" that flags of convenience represent, yet their
132
widespread use continues.
Under UNCLOS Articles 90-94, flag states have some obligation
to exercise jurisdiction and control over ships on their registry. Article
90 provides that every state-including land-locked states--can
register ships. 1 33 Article 91 ostensibly narrows the scope of national
registration by requiring that "[t]here must exist a genuine link
between the State and the ship." 134 Despite the apparent limitation
created by Article 91, the factors that are used to determine whether a
genuine link exists set a low bar for showing the connection. 135
Despite these ostensible obligations, whether flag states are able
to exercise control in fact depends significantly on their ability to take
enforcement actions against vessels that violate domestic laws. Open
registry states are only able to take action against the nominal owner
listed on their registry, meaning their most substantial enforcement
action would be to de-register a ship. 136 This leaves little accountability
for a vessel's true owner to remedy safety or environmental hazards
created and only imposes the cost of re-registering in a different

LNG from the Unites States, which would decrease the competitiveness of U.S. LNG as
compared to other sources.").
131. Id. at 26.
132. See Benham, supra note 125, at 124 (discussing the problem of flags of
convenience generally and noting also that this loophole has "contributed to the current
global deficit in governance of the oceans."); see also Anastasia Telesetsky, Scuttling Iuu
Fishing and Rewarding Sustainable Fishing: Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Port
State Measures Agreement with Trade-Related Measures, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1237,
1248 (2015) (highlighting a move to implicitly recognize that flags of convenience "are
part of the problem" of illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing); H. Edwin Anderson,
III, The Nationality of Ships and Flags of Convenience: Economics, Politics, and
Alternatives, 21 TUL. MAR. L.J. 139, 162-66 (1996) (separating the challenges raised by
flags of convenience into environmental, safety, and labor categories). Cf. Stefan
Kirchner, et al., Coastal State Obligations in the Context of Refugees at Sea Under the
European Convention on Human Rights, 20 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 57, 68 (2015) ("While
there are still some states which offer flags of convenience, enabling ship owners to
operate ships at very low environmental and employment standards, the situation has
been improved significantly in recent years as the shipping industry has undergone a
process of professionalization and globalization.").
133. UNCLOS, supra note 70, art. 90.
134. Id. art. 91(1).
135. Factors that are relevant to finding a genuine link include the fleet's
contribution to the national economy of the flag country, employment of nationals on
vessels, and the beneficial ownership of the vessel. See Benham, supra note 125, at 126.
136. Id. at 127 ('Since these countries, unlike the normal registry owners, do not
impose taxes, they do not have an incentive to identify the real owners ....
").
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state. 137 Port state action can have a localized impact, 138 but would do
so at a significant cost 139 and would thus fail to create a genuine
incentive for ship owners to employ energy efficient technologies.
International efforts to remedy this situation have been
attempted, but have so far been ineffective. As an example, in 1986, an
international instrument was negotiated to create new benchmarks for
accountability in shipping-the United Nations Convention on
Conditions for the Registration of Ships. 140 Article 5 of the Convention
stipulated that a "flag state shall have a competent and adequate
national maritime administration," and required that such an
administration ensures that ships flying its state's flag comply with
both the state's laws and regulations, and with "applicable
international rules and standards concerning ... the safety of ships
and persons on board and the prevention of pollution of the marine
environment.' '141 The same Article went even further, requiring that
flag states themselves require "all the appropriate information
necessary for full identification and accountability concerning ships
flying its flag." 14 2 These provisions would have bolstered the impact of
other international agreements on marine pollution both by mandating
that the flag state resolve the information deficits that make
enforcement difficult and by obliging open registry states to ensure
compliance with international instruments. Thirty years after it was
negotiated, the Convention has still not come into force. 143 In some
situations, governments can successfully regulate a common pool
resource, facilitating collective action by enforcing penalties against
resource users who do not join the action. 144 Here, however, the ability
of ship owners to freely choose which flag to fly renders any one
government incapable of organizing enough of the industry to

137. Id. ("[N]ominal owners can circumvent deregistration by changing their
company and ship name, and subsequently re-register.").
138. See id. ("A port State can take action against the crew of a vessel, but the
owners are effectively outside its jurisdiction."). But see Michael Standert, China Ports
to Require Los-Sulfur Fuel for Oceangoing Vessels, 239 Daily Env't Rep. (I3NA) A-7 (Dec.
14, 2015).

139. See, e.g., Jer~ny Mandel, U.S. shipping requirement could derail industry GAO, ENERGYWIRE (Dec. 4, 2015), http://www.eenews.net/energywire/2015/12/04/storie
s/1060028968 [http://perma.cc/GA7Z-RZ6D] (archived Oct. 22, 2016) (arguing that
requiring tankers who want to export U.S. LNG to only operate under U.S. Flags would
be prohibitively costly).
140. United Nations Convention on Conditions for Registration of Ships, Feb. 7,
1986, U.N. Doc.TD/RS/CONF/23.
141. Id. art. 5(2), (3) (emphasis added).
142. Id. art. 5(4).
143. Status of United Nations Convention on Conditions for Registrationof Ships,

U.N. TREATY COLLECTION (last visited Oct. 8, 2016) https://treaties.un.org/pagesView
Details.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg no=XII-7&chapter=12&clangren [https://perma.cc/
8CQG-5MDC] (archived Oct. 8, 2016).
144. See infra text accompanying notes 163-65.
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overcome ship owners' disincentives to embrace efficiency. This
highlights a state-level collective action problem which closely
resembles the problem as encountered by individual ship owners: one
state can elect to impose strict requirements on vessels flying its flag,
but risks many of those ships de-registering and transferring to a more
convenient flag state.
2. Principal-Agent Incentive Problem
Market failures are another factor responsible for limiting the
adoption of energy-efficient technologies in shipping. These failures
include principal-agent problems created by conflict of interest
between a charterer 145 and a ship owner, externalities, and
information deficits. 146 Each of these problems uniquely contributes an
obstacle or creates a disincentive for an individual participant in the
global climate system to take action to prevent harms to it. These
problems are characterized as market failures-rather than regulatory
gaps-because this Note argues that market solutions are viable
options to moving past them.
The first of these market failures, the principal-agent problem, is
comparable to the same problem in real estate: a landlord lacks the
incentive to invest in energy-efficient technologies when it is the tenant
who pays the utility bills. 147 The problem in shipping is that the
charterer paying for his or her goods to be shipped usually pays the
fuel costs for the voyage. Although the charterer may prefer to lower
the fuel bill, the ship owner is indifferent. 148 Since ship owners can
pass the costs of inefficient vessels through to the customer, they lack
an incentive to invest their own capital in efficiency. 149 In addition,
demands for quick service counsel ship owners toward inefficient
voyage planning. The MEPC recognized this problem when it was
producing its voluntary efficiency standards, but has not directly

145. The charterer refers to the customer who hires a ship to transport her goods
from one place to another.
146. EASON, supra note 6, at 21. These categories are taken from the CWR Report,
which includes lack of financing as a fourth category. Since the focus of this Note is on
the relationship between private motivation and behavior change in the context of
reducing GHG emissions, addressing the implementation challenges that
environmentally friendly financing reforms would need to overcome is beyond its scope.
147. See, e.g., HEISMAN & TOMKINS, supra note 5, at 21. ('This is a familiar incentive
problem, also seen in the commercial real estate sector where building owners' [sic] are
not incentivized to invest in energy efficient upgrades that would ultimately save their
tenants money on utility bills.").
148. See id. at 23.
149. Id. at 21.
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addressed it. 150 The committee instead suggested generally that
"[e]fforts should be made when agreeing charter party terms to
encourage the ship to operate at optimum speed in order to maximize
15 1
energy efficiency."
By splitting control of the ships efficiency from the cost of fuel,
each party has less power to affect an efficient voyage. The ship owner
is the party in the best position to make changes to a ship, and the only
party that can directly control operational decisions affecting
efficiency. If the ship's owner does not bear the cost of fuel, however,
she has little incentive to take any steps to reduce that cost. The
charter likely wants to reduce the costs of fuel as much as possible for
a particular voyage, but ultimately lacks control over the ship. Even
though the charterer may be able to bargain for more efficient practices
and agree to bear the cost-and this Note argues that this power is
significant-the cost of obtaining enough information about what
efficiencies are available may prevent the use of this power.
The second of these market failures is the failure to price
environmental services being depleted by those emitting greenhouse
gasses. The shipping industry is currently able to externalize the
environmental and human health impacts of its emissions. Shipping
inefficiency is a collective action problem, where the common pool
resource is the atmosphere as a sink for greenhouse gases. 152 Garrett
Hardin famously described a problem of this kind as a tragedy of the
commons. 153 Each individual has an incentive to exploit more than an
equal share because the incremental benefit of using more of the
resource is kept to his or herself, while the reduction in the total value
of the resource is distributed amongst all of the resources' users. For
shipping, this problem appears where, in the absence of an enforced
carbon price, the climate consequences of shipping's greenhouse gas
emissions are not attributable to ship owners. It costs nothing to emit
greenhouse gasses, so if there is profit to be made by operating in a way
that increases emissions, there is no economic disincentive from
operating in that way.
Hardin's work has been criticized as an oversimplification by
scholars who point out that there are examples of common pool

150. See SEEMP Resolution, supra note 66, at 8 ("It is recognized that under many
charter parties the speed of the vessel is determined by the charterer and not the
operator.").
151. Id.
152. See Robert N. Stavins, The Problem of the Commons: Still Unsettled after 100
Years, 101 AM. ECON R. 81, 98 (2011) ("Climate change is a commons problem of
unparalleled magnitude... for any individual political jurisdiction, the direct benefits
of taking action will inevitably be less than the costs, producing a free-rider
problem ....
").
153. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1244-46
(1968).

VANDERBILTJOUZNAL

OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

[VOL. 49.1143

resources that are sustainably managed. 154 Unlike the atmosphere as
a whole, those resources that are sustainably managed without
government are characteristically ones that can be cheaply monitored,
used by communities with robust social networks that can easily
exclude outside users, and where the users themselves support rule
enforcement. 155 Ship owners exhibit few of these characteristics,
suggesting that it is unlikely that the resource-users autonomously
56
govern greenhouse gas emissions in a sustainable way.1
Information deficits-the third of these market failures-limit the
ability of charterers to understand what operational improvements in
efficiency are available and which ships are inherently more fuel
efficient. 157 The IMO's greenhouse gas emissions studies provide
significant information on emissions, but fall short of providing a
charterer with all the information that could be used to make a decision
on what efficiencies might be used. 158 Although there are attempts to
address this, the existence of the IMO studies serves to confirm the
significance of the information deficit. 159
B. Proposals that Are Already in Place
Despite being relatively well-understood, the problems that have
prevented greater efficiency in shipping have not engendered effective
solutions. 160 Many of these solutions recognize the fundamental
collective action problem that shipping efficiency presents, but most
suggestions still depend on a government or governments to implement
and enforce some kind of regime-command-and-control regulation,

154. See Thomas Dietz, Elinor Ostrom, and Paul C. Stern, The Struggle to Govern
the Commons, 302 SCI. 1907, 1907 (2003) (suggesting that Hardin erred both by
assuming that governmental institutions were the only way to sustain common pool
resources, and that users were trapped in the system without the ability to create
solutions).
155. Id. at 1908.
156. But see Vandenbergh, Private Governance, supra note 24, at 168 ("[A]lthough
the global nature of some problems may vastly increase the number of parties at both
ends ... [ftor some goods, a small group of large corporate producers exists, as does a
small group of global advocacy groups.").
157. HEISMAN & TOMKINS, supra note 5, at 21.
158. See id. at 25 ("Missing from the [IMO's] report is an assessment of how to
effectively address the existing barriers to change to fully realize the technological gains
available to the industry.").
159. See infra Subsection IV.B.1 (describing the existing certification efforts in the
context of shipping emissions); see also Tracey M. Roberts, The Rise of Rule Four
Institutions:Voluntary Standards, Certificationand Labeling Systems, 40 ECOLOGY L.Q.
107, 153 (2013) ("Voluntary standards, certification and labeling systems identify and
make visible the social, environmental and health impacts of resource extraction,
harvesting and manufacturing in global trade.").
160. See, e.g., Alice Bows-Larkin, All Adrift: Aviation, Shipping, and Climate
Change Policy, 15 CLIMATE POL'Y 681, 693 (2015) (aggregating information on carbon
reduction pathways for both aviation and shipping).
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licensing, or creating tradeable rights. Cap-and-trade systems
dominate the field of currently-proposed market-based solutions, and
these proposals generally presume implementation by either the IMO
or a new international agreement under UNFCCC or UNCLOS.
Recognizing how difficult this may be, some of these solutions instead
focus on port state controls on the ships that visit them. Finally, some
proposals call for important states engaged in the industry to
implement unilateral measures aimed at vessels themselves, rooted in
national laws. Suggestions like these depend on political will to
implement, and to whatever degree they are not self-enforcing, these
suggestions may require state enforcement in order to be effective. As
a result, they fail to overcome the substantial challenge of flags of
convenience.
1. Greater Port State Controls on the Ships that Visit Them
Customary international law has largely accepted that a port
state has some limited control over the ships that visit it. 161 And under
UNCLOS Article 218, a port state is empowered to investigate a vessel
"in respect of any discharge from that vessel outside the internal
waters, territorial sea or exclusive economic zone of that State in
violation of applicable international rules or standards ....162 Even
where a vessel is navigating through a coastal state's waters without
reaching a port, that state has, at least on paper, significant
enforcement authority. 163 The effect of these provisions is that a port
state has power to control which ships it admits. "If it imposes
conditions on entry, and a foreign vessel enters without complying with
those conditions, that vessel has violated the 'contract' and now being
within the territory of the port state, can be punished for that
violation." 164 Advocates of using port state jurisdiction to address
marine pollution point out that "[i]nternational law is clear that the
authority of the port state is superior to that of the flag state while the

161. See George C. Kasoulides, Global and Regional Port State Regimes, in
COMPETEING NORMS IN THE LAW OF MARINE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 121, 121

(Henrik Ringbom ed., 1997) ('The dicta of customary international law prevailed that as
a rule the port state does not have jurisdiction over vessels in its internal waters
regarding polluting activities attributed to these vessels if these activities have no
territorial link to the state concerned.").
162. UNCLOS, supra note 70, art. 218.
163. See id. At art. 220 ("Where there is clear objective evidence that a vessel
navigating in the exclusive economic zone or the territorial sea of a State
has ... committed a violation ... causing major damage or threat of major damage to
the coastline or related interests of the coastal State ...that State may ... institute
proceedings, including detention of the vessel, in accordance with its laws.").
164. Michael W. Reed, Port and CoastalState Control of Atmospheric Pollutionfrom
Merchant Vessels, 3 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 205, 213 (2012).
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vessel is in port. ' 165 The same advocates also note that "[a] port state's
authority goes so far as to permit its insistence on certain design and
'166
construction standards.
But despite these ostensible powers granted under UNCLOS,
significant obstacles exist to using port state control in the context of
greenhouse gas emissions. A state that wishes to be tough in
prosecuting environmental violations in its exclusive economic zone
risks running afoul of other domestic economic interests. 167 Even
investigating aggressively in order to make information public, thereby
eliciting more voluntary compliance, threatens costly delays that may
168
be unacceptable.
Although these obstacles have been overcome in other contexts,
like dealing with invasive species and dumping, 169 they show the
inadequacy of port state jurisdiction for reducing greenhouse gas
emissions in sharp relief. The gap between what can be done to
increase shipping's efficiency and what is being done has been created
in part by the reticence of governments to use their authority to
regulate in the climate context. Thus, even if a port state or group of
states could impose restrictions that serve to reduce emissions, there
is little evidence that they are willing or likely to do so. Professor Reed's
assessment that the "Law of the Sea has achieved a workable balance
between the interests of maritime States (freedom of navigation) and
coastal States (environmental protection)" 170 is accurate with regard
to politically neutral actions to reduce more traditional forms of marine
pollution. Where it is incomplete however, is on the issue of greenhouse
gasses.
2. Market-Based Mechanisms
Market based mechanisms (MBMs) are generally viewed as
necessary for maximizing shipping efficiency. 171 These mechanisms

165. Ted L. McDorman, Regional Port State Control Agreements: Some Issues of
InternationalLaw, 5 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 207, 211 (2000).
166. Reed, supra note 164, at 214. While Professor Reed cites several examples, the
extent to which this is actually feasible for the United States is unclear, and is far beyond
the scope of this note. The United States is not a party to UNCLOS. But see Hull, supra
note 91, at 1037 (arging that EPA has a non-discretionary duty to regulate emissions
from ocean-going vessels).
167. Kasoulides, supra note 161, at 125.
168. See id. ("Immobilizing tankers at sea for purposes of boarding and inspection
is a very complex and dangerous enterprise especially on certain routes used intensively
for navigation.").
169. See Reed, supra note 164, at 225-26 (citing four examples of U.S. government
placing limitations on certain pollution-related aspects of ships entering its waters).
170. Id. at 242.
171. See, e.g., Lema & Papaioanou, supra note 23, at 242-43 (discussing deadlock
in stakeholders' discussion of how to implement a market-based mechanism for
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have been met with resistance by some stakeholders, but their
potential effectiveness is widely accepted among countries in the
IMO. 172 The reasons cited in favor of MBMs focus on the incentives
they create for ship owners and the possibility of offsetting the growth
173
If
in the industry while preserving shipping's role in world trade.
successful, these measures would correct the problem of externalities
by imposing real costs based on a ship's pollution. IMO experts have
even concluded that MBMs could be the most cost efficient way to
reduce shipping's emissions, and some have argued that they comport
with customary international law by implicating the "polluter pays"
174
principle by causing a ship owner to pay for her ship's emissions.
The archetypical MBM is a cap-and-trade scheme, placing a limit
on the total emissions that can be produced, and a scheme to trade
allowances. 175 Theoretically, emitters have an incentive to reduce their
emissions when the financial benefit of selling an allowance is greater
than their cost in earning it.176 Recognizing that measures like these
could have a significant impact on shipping, the IMO's MEPC produced
an expert group study in 2010 on MBMs for reducing greenhouse gas
emissions from shipping. 177 The group's report analyzed proposals
from states and industry groups that expressed wide variations on the
basic structure. 178 The positions taken included: a cap-and-trade
scheme managed by UNFCCC or IMO funded in part by a per-ton tax
on fuel; a leveraged incentive system that would refund a fuel tax to
ships meeting or exceeding efficiency benchmarks; port state levies
referencing visiting ships' relative efficiency; a shipping-sector-wide
cap on emissions with the possibility of purchasing out-of-sector
179
offsets; and several more.

greenhouse gas emissions reductions from shipping, despite the the fact that parties
agree that it is necessary).
172. See id. (discussing ship-owners' perception that MBMs would "cause
managerial problems and bureaucracy, both onboard and ashore," but concluding that
"the majority of countries in the IMO still believe that an MBM is necessary").
173. Id. at 243.
174. Id.
175. See generally Sarah E. Light, The New Insider Trading: Environmental
Markets Within the Firm, 34 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 18-22 (2015) (discussing the theory
and practice of cap-and-trade schemes).
176. See id. at 18 ("Emitters face financial incentives to reduce emissions when the
price of reducing one marginal unit of emissions is less than the cost of an allowance and
to purchase allowances from others when the price is less than their marginal cost of
reducing emissions.").
177. Marine Environment Protection Commission, Reduction of GHG Emissions
from Ships, MEPC 61/INF.2 (Aug. 13, 2010), http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/
Environment/PollutionPrevention/AirPollutionDocuments/INF-2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4W3H-E3BW] (archived Aug. 31, 2016) [hereinafter IMO MBM
STUDY].

178. See id. at 6-9 (providing an overview of the ten MBM proposals analyzed in
the report).

179. Id.
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The fundamental challenge of MBMs designed to address shipping
emissions is in their implementation. The MEPC Expert Group was in
agreement that the proposals they analyzed could be implemented, but
did so with the caveat that "the time necessary [in order to do so] would
be impacted by broader policy considerations."1 80 And these experts
disagreed about the role that the principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities would play in implementing an MBM for
shipping's emissions.18 1 These proposals attempt to address the statelevel collective action problem presented by flags of convenience by
suggesting that a UN agency-the IMO-implement an MBM. But
history suggests that this is not happening. In his own analysis of the
proposals that MEPC considered however, Hariloas Psaraftis-a
member of the IMO's Expert Group on greenhouse gasses-noted the
steep political challenges to implementing an MBM: "[o]ne would hope
that this difficult process would eventually find a way to move forward.
Still, as things stand at this time, the path toward the ultimate
selection of an MBM for international shipping seems to be tortuous
'18 2
and long.
3. Regulating More Strictly Under National Laws
Some scholars have suggested that an avenue through which
shipping's emissions might be reduced is through national laws of key
players in the industry.18 3 For example, Michael Hull has argued that
the EPA has a nondiscretionary duty under § 213 of the Clean Air Act
to regulate emissions from ocean-going vessels.18 4 Hull argues, "the
EPA should be required to promulgate meaningful emissions
standards for [ocean-going vessel] engines consistent with the
mandates of the CAA," but it is difficult to see how this mandate could
get around the incentives and flags of convenience problems.1 8 5
And to the extent that this is a challenging interpretation of § 213,
general principles of statutory interpretation will not bolster it. The
Charming Betsy canon indicates that "an act of Congress ought never
to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible
construction remains. '18 6 There are examples of appellate courts in the

180. Id. at 16.

181. Id.
182. Harilaos N. Psaraftis, Market-Based Measures for Greenhouse Gas Emissions
from Ships: A Review, 11 WORLD MAR. U. J. OF MAR. AFF. 211, 231 (2012).
183. See Kevin Anderson & Alice Bows, Executing a Scharnow Turn: Reconciling
Shipping Emissions with international Commitments on Climate Change, 3 CARBON
MGMT. 615, 626 (2012) (arguing for "[v]ery stringent regulation or incentive mechanisms
to deliver a wholesale shift to low-carbon shipping").
184. Hull, supranote 91, at 1060-61 (citing 42 U.S.C. §7547).
185. Id. at 1061.
186. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804).
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United States parsing international law in an effort to construe a U.S.
statute consistently with it.187 As a canon of statutory interpretation,
however, Charming Betsy does not place a substantive limit on
Congress' authority to abrogate international law, nor does it displace
the presumption against extraterritorial application. 188 Charming
Betsy would be poorly suited as a tool for drawing international norms
into the interpretation of U.S. law; "[the Charming.Betsy canon] only
exerts a negative force on the meaning of statutes, pushing them away
18 9
from meanings that would conflict with international law."
This one example illustrates what can be expected from any
unilateral national action aimed at reducing shipping's emissions or
any other aspect of climate change.1 90 No one country is in a position
to alter the incentives of all the others, and it appears far-fetched that
national laws protecting ship-owners, particularly in open registry
states, could be abrogated in favor of international environmental
laws. Even to the extent that one state did attempt to have an
expansive impact on foreign vessels, its efforts would likely be
vulnerable to challenge under international trade law. 19 1
IV. A PRIATE GOVERNANCE RESPONSE
Private governance can address the core collective action problem
and the market failures described above, and can do so in a way that
does not require governmental intervention. In view of the limited
political feasibility of creating robust international regimes on
shipping emissions and the flexibility of private solutions as conditions
change, private solutions are particularly important. Private solutions

187. See, e.g., United States v. Ali, 718 F.3d 929, 936 (D.C. Cir. 2013) ("[B]ecause
Charming Betsy counsels against interpreting federal statues to contravene
international law, we must satisfy ourselves that prosecuting Ali for aiding and abetting
piracy would be consistent with the law of nations.").
188. See, e.g., id. at 935 ("Neither [Charming Betsy nor the presumption against
extraterritorial application] imposes a substantive limit on Congress's legislative
authority, but they do constrain judicial inquiry into a statute's scope."). See also United
States v. Ballestas, 795 F.3d 138, 144 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Yousef,
327 F.3d 56, 93 (2d Cir. 2003)) ("[If 'a statute makes plain Congress's intent,' a court
'must enforce the intent of Congress irrespective of whether the statute conforms to
customary international law."').
189. Al-Bihani v. Obama, 619 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Brown, J., concurring).
190. See Vandenbergh, Private Governance, supra note 24, at 169-70 ("National
governments have little ability to regulate environmental behavior in other countries,
and the international trade regime makes it difficult to impose requirements on goods
based on the characteristics of the process by which they are produced, as opposed to the
characteristics of the finished good.").
191. See generally General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 188 (prohibiting trade measures that violate antidiscrimination
provisions of the treaty, unless those trade measures are aimed at protecting the
environment and provided they are not implemented in a discriminatory way).
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can play an important role in limiting emissions where regulations are
absent and alongside formal legal structures which fail to succeed in
192
protecting environmental quality.
Scott, et al., argue that a hybrid of public and private governance
can mitigate greenhouse gas emissions from shipping. 193 In contrast,
this Part describes how the most notable unique power of private
governance is its ability to operate effectively outside the limits of
public governance. Alice Bows-Larkin, who noted that "a pragmatic
approach would be to influence, incentivize, or set standards around
technology and the operational options for shipping," alluded to this
concept. 194 This Part expands on Bows-Larkin's idea, demonstrating
how private environmental governance can address each of the
problems identified in the preceding Parts without a need for political
feasibility.
A. DistinguishingPrivate and Public Environmental Governance
The basic model of domestic environmental law as a collection of
prescriptive legislative acts and regulations that enforce certain
environmental behaviors through a state's police power fails to capture
the full range of mechanisms through which environmental behavior
is actually shaped. Comparably, a model of international
environmental law that is confined to treaties, conventions, and the
threat of sanctions misses the reality of private transnational
instruments that impact global behavior relating to the environment.
Instead of being confined to legislative or regulatory enactments,
"[e]nvironmental preferences are expressed in purchasing, lending,
investing, and supply chain contracting decisions .... 19 5
Private environmental governance refers to the set of actions
"taken by non-governmental entities that are designed to achieve
traditionally governmental ends such as managing the exploitation of
common pool resources, increasing the provision of public goods,
reducing environmental externalities, or more justly distributing
environmental amenities." 196 Existing literature on private
environmental governance demonstrates meaningful applications of
these tools. 1 97 These measures serve to address the gap in governance

192. See Vandenbergh & Gilligan, Beyond Gridlock, supra note 20, at 303
("[Pirivate climate governance strategy ... is not a substitute for a national and
international carbon price, but it can generate significant emissions reductions until
more complete responses become possible.").
193. See Scott, et al., supra note 28.
194. Bows-Larkin, supra note 160.
195. Vandenbergh, Private Governance, supranote 24, at 137.
196. Id. at 146.
197. See, e.g., Amanda C. Leiter, Fracking,Federalism,and Private Governance, 39
HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 107, 151 (2015) ("[P]rivate entities have already been quite
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left by the absence of an international legal instrument addressing
198
shipping emissions.
B. Shipping Efficiency Is ParticularlyWell-Suited to
Private Governance
Proposals that attempt to make shipping more efficient through
creating stricter legal requirements for ships are blocked by collective
action problems at an individual or state level. Individuals lack a
motive to undertake efficiency measures that place them at a
disadvantage relative to competitors, and individual nations similarly
lack an incentive to send their ships overseas by creating uncommonly
strict rules for their registry. Hybrid forms of governance must still
work within the bounds of political feasibility to the extent that they
require information or actions that only arise from public enforcementmotivated compliance. As a result, public-private hybrid regulatory
schemes miss out on the unique opportunities to solve pernicious
market failures; a private governance approach does not solve these
problems, it bypasses them.
Private governance incorporates a broad range of instruments but
excludes government-created carbon trading mechanisms. 199
Articulating every possible application of private environmental
governance is beyond the scope of this Note, 200 but two applications of
the concept that have a particularly clear relevance to carbon
emissions from shipping merit close consideration: private standardsetting and supply chain contracting. These forms of governance are
not unique to shipping, but have clear applications in this field.

successful in collecting information on shale gas risks and in developing standards to
address those risks."); Zdravka Tzankova, Interactions Between Private and Public
Resource Governance:Key Insights from the Fisheries Case, 6 WM. & MARY POL'Y REV. 1,
25 (2014) ("The private regulatory initiatives of movement ENGOs [environmental nongovernmental organizations] thus seem to be improving the potential for success in
addressing some long-standing and change-resistant problems in the public
management of public trust fishery resources.").
198. See Vandenbergh, Private Governance, supra note 24, at 161 (expressing that
private governance is sometimes a response to a government's failure to act, citing the
example of international law's difficulty with managing global commons).
199. See id. at 144 ("[A]lthough cap-and-trade has been a favored response to
climate change, it requires government action such as the Waxman-Markey climate
legislation, which would have created... [an] entitlement system for greenhouse gas
emissions.").
200. For a rigorous discussion of the theory of private environmental governance
see Vandenbergh, PrivateGovernance, supra note 24, at 162-98.
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1. Private Governance Solutions Obviate the Issues Raised by
Flags of Convenience
Unilateral private standard-setting is the paradigmatic private
environmental governance activity, led by examples like the Forestry
Stewardship Council 201 and the Marine Stewardship Council
(MSC). 202 Using the input of scientists, fisheries managers and
industry representatives, the MSC developed a standard for
sustainability in ocean fisheries. 203 Third-party auditors certify a
fishery, which allows processors and retailers to use a recognizable
MSC logo. 20 4 The process mitigates the impossibly high cost that an
individual would face when attempting to single-handedly obtain all
the information necessary to determine that a fishery is sustainable. 205
In contrast with a government standard, this private process avoids
the potential for regulatory capture. 20 6 In addition, by creating a label
that commands a premium in the market, standards like MSC's shift
the cost of compliance from enforcement agencies to the producer, who
is then faced with the choice of complying-and bearing the cost of
enforcement in the form of the cost of obtaining and maintaining
certification-or being left out of the market. The producer, then, can
pass this cost on to consumers.
Private standard-setting already has an impact in other
contexts 20 7 and is already at work in the shipping industry. One
example is RightShip, a company that is equally owned by BHP
Billiton, Rio Tinto, and Cargill. 208 Rightship focuses on helping

201. See Our History, FORESTRY STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, https://us.fsc.org/enus/who-we-are/our-history (last visited Sept. 4, 2016) [http://perma.cc/27L8-DNEX]
(archived Sept. 4, 2016) (describing how the Council was formed in the wake of the Rio
summit's failure on deforestation in order to create a market-based approach that would
be a voluntary alternative to counter-productive boycotts).
202. See Will Martin, Marine Stewardship Council: A Case Study in Private
Environmental Standard-Setting, 44 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10097, 10097
(2014) ("The story of MSC's development provides a case study of how private
environmental standard-setters can make change happen, outside the context of laws
and regulation.").
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. See Roberts, supra note 159, at 154 (Voluntary certification and labelling
systems "overcome collective-action problems to aggregate consumer demand, which
supports a price sufficient to encourage producers and manufacturers to undertake the
costs associated with shifting their production processes.").
206. See id. at 140.
207. See, e.g., Vandenbergh, Private Goverance, supra note 24, at 150 ("[R]oughly
sixty percent of the seafood caught for consumption from U.S. fisheries is certified or is
from fisheries that are under assessment for certification.").
208. Governance, RIGHTSHIP, http://site.rightship.com/about/governance/
(last
visited Sept. 4, 2016) [http://perma.cc/4S8A-7JBJ] (archived Sept. 4, 2016). While it is
not an example of the kind of instruments of private governance discussed here, it bears
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companies eliminate ships with inadequate safety standards from
their supply chain, and has also created an emissions rating-on an AG scale-in order to help customers make informed decisions about
which ships to use. 20 9 This rating system focuses on design issues in
existing ships. As a result, it does not take into account in-use
efficiencies and so it does not fully rate all of the measurable aspects of
210
a ship's emissions.
Having a rating system in place can allow consumers to act on
their environmental preferences: "[t]o the extent environmental
protection is in a consumer's preference set, labeling systems provide
the information about the provenance and performance of the good
necessary to enable the consumer to act on the preference." 211 But
these standards are not widely known outside of the industry. If these
standards are to have a lasting and meaningful impact on the industry,
they will also need to enhance their credibility by tackling the complete
spectrum of a ship or fleet's emissions. In addition, standards like
Rightship exemplify how private governance instruments can increase
public participation, capitalizing on the private democratic processes
that the MSC exemplifies, in order to ensure that stakeholders have a
real impact on what standards will be set. 212
An effective certification system for efficient shipping is one
example of how the body of private governance tools can elicit
compliance from shippers without the need for any particular flag state
to impose requirements on its ships. It would create an incentive to

mention that EfficientShip Finance is another actor in this field. The firm is an advisory
and investment entity that focuses of fuel efficiency, investing in efficiency technologies
on existing ships to reduce their carbon emissions. For more information,
see NIKOS PETRAKAKOS, EFFICIENTSHiP FINANCE (2015), http://www.shippingefficiency
0
.org/sites/shippingefficiency.org/files/press/files/Nikos%2
Petrakakos%2Opl -19%20Bu
lletin%2ONo2%202015%201o-res.pdf [https://perma.cc/5ZL8-W5X6] (archived Oct. 23,
2016).
209. GHG Emissions Rating, RIGHTSHIP, http://site.rightship.com/services/ghgemissions-rating/ (last visited Sept. 4, 2016) [http://perma.cc/6JSM-9DZM] (archived
Sept. 4, 2016). RightShip lists five benefits of its environmental rating, which highlight
the key issues here remarkably well. These include: "[informed selection for reducing
emissions [2] opportunity for charterers to align vessel selection with their company
sustainability standards [3] opportunity for charterers to reduce their bunker bills [4]
rewarding and recognizing sustainable operators through greater acceptance of their
ships [5] fast and easy access to data that has previously been dispersed and costly to
gather. Id.
210. Environmental FAQs, RIGHTSHIP, http://site.rightship.com/faqs/environmentfaqs/ (last visited Sept. 4, 2016) [http://perma.cc/UZ5V-JPTZ] (archived Sept. 4, 2016)
("The GHG Emissions Rating is calculated based on a vessel's design specifications and
therefore is not impacted by the way the vessel is operated.").
211. Vandenbergh, Private Governance, supra note 24, at 167.
212. See Martin, supra note 202, at 10099 ("Scientific decisions [of the Marine
Stewardship Council] are transparent and vetted through a technical advisory board of
scientists, a stakeholder council, and then a public comment process, before the final
product is sent to the board of trustees for consideration and adoption.").
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obtain certification in order to charge a premium for lower-emissions
shipping. 213 Because individual ship owners are able to charge more,
they are no longer bearing a cost that creates a competitive
disadvantage, thus addressing the problem of externalities. Because
the standard-setting institution is not a function of any one
government, compliance happens without regard to a vessel's flag state
and occurs on the ship owner's own impetus. This eliminates the need
for punitive enforcement and bypasses the political will obstacles that
preclude strict standards in open-registry states.
2. Split Incentives Can Be Addressed by Supply Chain Contracting
Supply-chain pressure could drive a certification-and-standards
system, or supply chain pressure could arise without a certification
system at all. Corporations and other transnational organizations have
significant power to affect behavior through supply chain
contracting. 214 They exercise that power to generate a form of private
environmental regulation as they feel pressure to control their
suppliers from "the threat of contract or tort liability, consumer
demand, targeting by name and shame campaigns and boycotts, and
pressures from socially responsible investors." 215 Supply-chain
pressures are thus not limited to large-scale corporate consumers who
demand efficiency for its cost-effectiveness, but instead can include the
actions of small businesses, organizations, and even individuals.
Enforcement of environmental provisions in supply-chain contracts
"occurs through shaming, boycotts, private inspections, contract
terminations or non-renewals, and preferential purchasing, not just
216
through government inspections and sanctions."
In response to these pressures, firms place demands on their
suppliers that go beyond the ordinary price demands for which any
firm would negotiate in a private transaction. Instead, they make

213. The reasons that a firm might be willing to pay more for efficient shipping are
varied, but can include pressure from investors, a desire to avoid potential liability, or
assuring long-term viability of a business model, among others. Michael P. Vandenbergh,
The New Wal-Mart Effect: The Role of Private Contracting in Global Governance, 54
UCLAL. REV. 913, 917 (2007) [hereinafter Wal-Mart].
214. See Larry Catd Backer, Private Actors and Public Governance Beyond the
State: The Multinational Corporation,the Financial Stability Board, and the Global
Governance Order, 18 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 751, 768 (2011) ("[C]orporations seek
to regularize behavior through the application of behavioral norms or standards
generated by other groups-particularly nongovernmental organizations that certify
products and set standards, or standard-setters concerned with substantive rules for
product production and quality.").
215. Tracey M. Roberts, Innovations in Governance: A Functional Typology of
Private Governance Institutions, 22 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 67, 87-88 (2011)
[hereinafter Roberts, Innovations in Governance].
216. Vandenbergh, Private Governance, supra note 24.
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demands that serve environmental ends, like requirements that
suppliers reduce energy use or maximize efficiency-usually
corresponding to lower emissions of greenhouse gasses. 217 A wellrecognized consequence of this activity is that firms are able to impose
quasi-regulatory requirements in foreign jurisdictions. 218 A firm in one
country is able to use its contracting to meet internal and external
demands for sustainability in the supply chain, even though the
supplier's state may not otherwise provide adequate sustainability
requirements. In this way, as Professor Roberts notes, "[s]upply chain
contracts and operations permit anchor firms to transfer technology
and management skills to countries where the rule of law and the
regulatory apparatus is weak. '2 19 This form of private governance thus
addresses inadequate environmental laws in flag states and can align
incentives of charterers and ship owners. Chartering firms' use of this
tool to require ship owners to meet their efficiency demands bypasses
any need for flag states to enforce separate environmental provisions,
and shifts the cost from the ship owner to the chartering firm-who
may be better able to bear it and may be able to pass it on to consumers
who are willing to pay for less carbon intensive products.
3. Private Solutions Avoid Many of the Problems that Plague Existing
Proposals
This Note argues that private governance can replace its public
counterpart in the context of reducing shipping's greenhouse gas
emissions. To the extent that it does not fully do so, measures like those
described here are technically and temporally gap-filling. They work to
fill the gaps left by international legal instruments that contemplate
carbon reductions insufficient to fully avoid the risk of catastrophic
climate disruption, and they address the need to reduce climate change
more quickly than current governance schemes would suggest. 220 They
do so by creating private incentives and obligations that do not depend

217. See id. 156.
218. See Roberts, supra note 159, at 126 (explaining the effect of firms placing
requirements on their suppliers); Wal-Mart, supra note 213, at 970 ("[f]n many cases
[private environmental governance] bypasses public entities altogether, transferring
demands for social amenities directly from the citizens of one country to the firms
operating in another."); Li-Wen Lin, Legal Transplants Through Private Contracting:
Codes of Vendor Conduct in Global Supply Chains as an Example, 57 AM. J. COMP. L.
711, 716 (2009) ("[M]ultinational companies, backed by their strong bargaining power,
have transmitted a new legal order to developing countries through contracting with
local suppliers ...").
219. Roberts, Innovations in Governance, supra note 215, at 88.
220. See Vandenbergh Private Governance, supra note 24, at 162 ("Private
governance measures also may fill gaps in timing that arise when a problem is identified
but governmental processes require time to generate and enforce public measures (e.g.,
private labeling responses to tuna-dolphin concerns and ozone depleters).").
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on a government (or governments) enforcing regulations, creating a
price and market for carbon, or otherwise intervening in the industry.
Rather than motivating compliance by threatening penalties, they
generate an incentive to voluntarily comply by paying a premium for
low-emissions shipping.
As discussed above, the currently-in-force international
agreements do not successfully regulate shipping's carbon emissions
now and are not likely to do so in the foreseeable future. MARPOL,
however effective it may be or may eventually become in theory, suffers
from enforcement deficits in states with open registries. Finally,
despite its ambitious goals, the UNFCCC has proven to be ineffective
to address this particular source of greenhouse gas emissions.
Although there was significant and largely merited optimism
surrounding early discussions of the Paris Agreement in other
contexts, the Agreement failed to address shipping explicitly.
Both supply chain contracting and collective standard-setting can
address this gap by bypassing the barriers to government action
entirely. A company working to improve its environmental image can
do so by requiring that ship owners take all the steps they can to
improve efficiency. Not only does this address the external pressures
that a firm could face, but it serves to decrease the fuel cost that the
firm would pay. Comparably, a firm could break from usual practice
and shift the cost of fuel to the shipper. This would mean changing
which party bears the risk of under-estimating a voyage's fuel cost,
potentially increasing costs. Such action would give ship owners an
incentive to be as efficient as possible however, and the premium
associated with being seen as an environmentally friendly company
would work to offset the cost. This is a way of internalizing the climate
costs of emitting carbon, and gives ship owners an independent
incentive to do so.
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V. CONCLUSION

Private environmental governance is a field of instruments that
can regulate shipping's greenhouse gas emissions more effectively than
public governance. It is more effective because it does not require states
to undertake goal-setting or legislative processes that are subject to the
limits of political feasibility. Instead, it bypasses many of the problems
that make traditional regulation particularly challenging in the
context of shipping. In addition, standards that are privately set can
reach beyond the ceiling on reductions inherent in the Paris
Agreement. As a result, private governance mechanisms that address
greenhouse gas emissions more quickly than the international legal
regime are feasible, and are effective alternatives to international
agreements in this area.
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